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The agreements of Europol with third countries: data protection 
and power asymmetry in counterterrorism 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates empirically the impact of power asymmetry and 
interest formation in European Union’s (EU) external relations with third 
countries in the context of the Europol data exchange and 
counterterrorism agreements. It focuses on three countries, namely the 
United States (U.S.), Turkey and Morocco, which have each a different 
level of counterterrorism cooperation with the EU. This article argues that 
the EU acts as a pragmatic actor with regard to Europol’s data exchange 
agreements with third countries, and that the power asymmetry between 
the EU and the third country under question determines the extent of the 
EU’s flexibility. If the power asymmetry favours the EU, then it insists on 
its data protection demands. Otherwise, the EU is more flexible towards 
its counterparts on data protection issues.  
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Introduction 
Since the end of the Second World War, the protection of human rights 
has gradually gained a prominent role, both among the EU member states 
and in the EU’s external relations. The EU and its member states are part 
of a comprehensive human rights regime based on documents such as the 
‘Charter of the Fundamental Rights of European Union’ (CFR) and the 
Council of Europe’s ‘European Convention on Human Rights’. Additionally, 
the EU has set the adoption of liberal democratic norms as a condition to 
third countries when these countries have sought to cooperate with EU. In 
particular, in the issue-area of counterterrorism the protection of human 
rights is considered by the EU as a vital requirement for cooperation with 
third countries. In its functions and operation, Europol is bound by the 
same human rights principles and treaties as the EU.  
 
Regarding data protection and data privacy in the EU, the right to privacy 
including data privacy has been elevated to the status of a fundamental 
human right and the EU has a detailed data protection regime (the 
comprehensive legislative framework model) 1  based on a number of 
international agreements, rules and regulations and regulated by data 
protection supervisory authorities. The protection of personal data has, 
therefore, a central place in Europol’s mode of operation as reflected in 
the organisation’s convention. In order for a third country to sign a data 
exchange agreement with Europol, it is required that this country has an 
adequate data protection framework.  
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, however, the EU and the Europol 
were subject to the criticism that they  were not  as sensitive on data 
protection rules  as before prioritizing instead the expansion  of counter-
terrorism cooperation with third countries.2 This had the risk of the EU  
losing its normative reputation in global politics which has been developed 
in the course of many years.   
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Contrary to the above concerns, this article presents a more complex 
picture of Europol’s relations with third states; Europol and the EU neither 
sacrifice their data protection rules completely for the sake of 
counterterrorism cooperation, nor do they enforce these rules to third 
countries consistently and in the same manner. This article shows that 
Europol pursues a pragmatic approach, depending each time on its 
bargaining power and the power asymmetry vis-à-vis the third country 
under question. If the power balance is in favour of the EU then the EU 
insists on the adoption of data protection rules by the third country as a 
precondition for signing counter-terrorism cooperation agreements. If the 
power balance is equal or in favour of the third country then the EU 
pursues a more flexible approach; it insists less on this country fully 
adopting EU’s data protection rules for the conclusion of agreements.  
 
In the literature, scholars have examined the issues of Europol’s 
democratic accountability and legitimacy3 and Europol’s effectiveness in 
the fight against organised crime. 4  Additional topics discussed in the 
literature include the establishment of Europol 5  and Europol’s 
international actorness in the field of counterterrorism. 6  The issue of 
whether Europol is consistent in safeguarding its data protection 
principles in the agreements it concludes with third countries has not, 
however, systematically examined. The only exception has been Pawlak’s 
examination of the closely related question of why the EU has not met 
any criticism or opposition by third countries on its data protection related 
practices; according to Pawlak, these practices are not consistent with the 
EU rhetoric which portrays the Union as a normative international actor 
with regard to data protection. 7  However, his study has not touched 
extensively upon the determinative role of the power asymmetry between 
the EU and third countries and its impact on rule transfer. This article 
takes Pawlak’s argument further in that it argues that the approach of the 
EU is pragmatic and intentional and that EU institutions take into 
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consideration the power dynamics and the interdependence with other 
countries when they negotiate counterterrorism agreements.  
 
In order to analyse Europol’s diverse approach regarding the operational 
agreements with third countries, this article examines three cases 
through a power asymmetry framework. These cases are the relations of 
Europol with the U.S., Turkey and Morocco. The cooperation of the above 
countries with Europol intensified since the 9/11 attacks. Each country’s 
relationship with Europol is based, however, on a different framework: 
transatlantic relations (loose interaction) for the U.S., EU candidate status 
(membership conditionality) for Turkey and European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) (policy conditionality) for Morocco. Regarding transatlantic 
relations, the U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation has expanded 
significantly and a number of agreements have been negotiated and 
concluded by the two partners. This relationship has been based on 
mutual benefits and common interests rather than being imposed by one 
of the partners. Concerning Turkey, Turkey’s relations with the EU are 
under the framework of membership conditionality, which postulates, 
among others, the adoption of data protection rules by Turkey as one of 
the conditions for Turkey being a member of the EU. The reluctance of 
Turkey to fulfil the EU requirements can inhibit both this country’s 
counterterrorism cooperation with the EU and Turkey’s membership 
prospect in general. Morocco, for its part, is one of the ENP countries. 
While membership is not in the agenda Morocco is encouraged to adopt 
the EU’s data protection rules through financial and technical assistance 
incentives. A comparison of the relations of Europol with the above three 
countries can provide insights on whether EU’s insistence on its data 
protection requirements is consistent or not. In cases of inconsistency, 
this article will look whether there is a link between power asymmetry 
and the EU’s diverse approach and at the conditions under which the EU 
abandons its hierarchical superiority on data protection.  
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This article has developed four factors through which the asymmetrical 
relations between two sides are measured and, thus, the power dynamics 
between the Europol and third countries are revealed. In brief, the 
attitude of Europol is shaped by interest calculations (the enhancement of 
EU’s and Europol’s counterterrorism institutions and structure), common 
threat perceptions with its counterparts, the reputational benefits to 
Europol from the cooperation with third countries, and the political 
environment that facilitates or impedes the conclusion of an agreement. 
In each country case the influence of the above factors is examined 
showing the link between these four factors and power asymmetry. 
Applying these factors into three countries that have a different level of 
counterterrorism cooperation with the EU can provide more insights on 
the issue of whether the EU approach is pragmatic or not. The empirical 
evidence for this article is drawn from official EU documents and elite 
interviews conducted with senior officials from the EU and the countries 
being investigated.  
 
This article starts with a brief historical background on Europol’s 
cooperation with third countries. The subsequent section presents the 
conceptual framework employed in this article, which is based on the 
concept of power asymmetry and interest formation. The main body of 
the article analyses the conditions under which Europol has negotiated the 
agreements with United States, Turkey and Morocco. The conclusion 
evaluates the role of power asymmetry in Europol’s agreements and 
relations with third countries and provides some policy prescriptions for 
EU’s political actors are facing a dilemma between liberty  and security.  
 
Counterterrorism cooperation of Europol with third countries and 
data protection rules 
The first steps of establishing a European criminal intelligence and law 
enforcement agency date back to 1991, when German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl suggested the creation of such an agency.8 His proposal came to life 
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in 1992 with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which postulated 
explicitly the creation of a European Police Office. Subsequently, the 
Europol Drugs Unit (the predecessor of Europol) emerged in January 
1994.9 Europol emerged out of this unit in 1995 when the EU’s member 
states signed the Europol Convention (1995) which came finally into 
operation in 1998.10   
 
Since the establishment of Europol, senior Europol officials emphasized in 
every occasion that cooperation with third countries was necessary for the 
fight against transnational crime. In line with this view, the Council of the 
EU adopted in 1997 an action plan against organised crime;11 among the 
plan’s recommendations was the enhancement of Europol’s ability to liaise 
with third countries and international organisations with the creation of 
suitable legal instruments. Additionally, in December 1997 the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council adopted three reports related to the exchange of 
police and criminal intelligence between Europol and third countries. 12 
These reports dealt with issues like the posting of liaison officers and the 
transmission of personal data from Europol to a third country. 
 
Initially, counter-terrorism was beyond Europol’s mandate, given, among 
others, the lack of a political agreement among Europeans on the 
definition of terrorism. 13  However, this situation started gradually to 
change through the efforts of the Spanish government, which has 
suffered from ETA’s (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) terrorist activities. In 1998, 
the Council of the EU agreed to add terrorism into Europol’s mandate.14 
Finally, the Council of the EU authorised in 2000 Europol’s Director to 
start negotiations with non-EU states and with international bodies and 
organisations for the conclusion of cooperation agreements.15 
 
Europol’s cooperation with third countries is based on two types of 
agreements, namely strategic agreements and operational agreements. 
The former aims to facilitate Europol’s cooperation with third countries 
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through the sharing of best practices and technical expertise and the 
establishment of liaison points; it does not include, however, the sharing 
of personal data. It is also a preliminary agreement in the sense that it 
can open the way for the conclusion of an operational agreement. The 
latter, allows the exchange of both personal and technical data between 
Europol and the law enforcement agencies of third countries.16 According 
to the rules of Europol, before the start of negotiations with a third 
country the data protection system of this country should be assessed 
according to the European standards.17 If a third country has adopted 
EU’s data protection rules, then the member countries can exchange 
information with this country through the Europol channels. However, in 
the absence of compliance with EU’s data protection regulations third 
countries cannot benefit from Europol’s intelligence.18  
 
As of August 2015, Europol has concluded operational agreements with 
thirteen countries (Albania, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Macedonia, 
Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
and the U.S.) and strategic agreements with five countries (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine). A quick 
look at these agreements gives a mixed picture regarding the inclusion of 
data protection rules; in other words, EU’s and Europol’s data protection 
requirements have not been fulfilled in the same way across the 
agreements. This lack of consistency is linked with the power of the EU 
vis-à-vis each country; EU is more effective in exporting its norms into 
countries that are not as powerful as the EU rather than into countries 
which have equal or more power than the EU.  
 
Power asymmetry, interest formation and the conditions for a 
change in asymmetry 
Power has been traditionally one of the main concepts through which 
scholars have tried to examine the relations among states and between 
states and international organisations. From the perspective of stronger 
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actors it can be defined as “the ability of an actor to get others to do 
something”.19 From the perspective of weaker actors power is “the ability 
to overcome the resistance of others”. 20  The equilibrium between the 
ability of a stronger player to impose its preferences and the ability of a 
weaker player to resist such an imposition determines the nature of the 
power relations between the two actors under question.  
 
Equally important to the concept of power is the concept of 
interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence 
emerges when there are intensive cross-border transactions between two 
or more actors, such as flows of money, goods, persons, and information, 
creating certain gains and losses for both parties. The actors which have a 
preponderance of resources and which are less dependent on 
international cooperation can influence more easily the actors which are 
more dependent on cooperation.21 In relations based on interdependence, 
the powerful actors may cause or trigger an interest formation process in 
the weaker actors which have a greater need to initiate or sustain the 
cooperation; in this way, weaker actors may abandon their previous 
legislative and institutional priorities.22 In such situations of asymmetric 
interdependence the actors which are more dependent on the cooperation 
with third states tend to compromise and to give concessions to these 
third states in order to secure the benefits gained from international 
cooperation.23  
 
Additionally, in the international relations literature power is often 
conceptualised as having two dimensions, namely “hard” power and “soft” 
power. Hard power is based on using coercive tactics for influencing other 
countries. On the contrary, soft power is based on persuasion tactics, 
social interactions and the promotion of norms and values for shaping the 
behaviour of other actors.24 The type of power that an actor favours the 
most depend on this actor’s “strategic culture” which is shaped by 
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historical experiences, strategic preferences, beliefs, values, and 
geographical necessities.25 
 
Concerning the external relations of the EU, it is one of the strongest 
political and economic actors in the world. The EU uses an external 
governance strategy to diffuse its rules and policies into third countries, 
including the countries without an EU membership perspective.26 Through 
the external governance of the area of justice and home affairs the EU 
transfers its internal security policies to third countries in order to 
enhance these countries’ law enforcement capabilities.27 To influence the 
internal security policies of third states, the EU relies on a soft power 
approach. It uses its political and trade power and the “tools” of the 
accession negotiations and the provision of technical assistance and aid 
opportunities.28 If a country is dependent on the opportunities provided 
by the EU, it is then in the interest of that country to maintain 
cooperation with the EU and this country may adopt the EU rules if the 
benefits of rule adoption exceed the internal political costs. This 
dependence increases the EU’s leverage over these countries and the EU 
benefits from this asymmetric interdependence in that it is used as a 
bargaining chip in order to ensure domestic security policy change and 
adaptation in third countries.  
 
The EU is not always the dominant actor in its relations with third 
countries. Depending on the circumstances, there might be cases where 
the EU is politically and economically dependent on other states.  In such 
cases, there is asymmetry of power between the EU and these countries 
and the EU cannot always fully impose its rules on them. In other words, 
in these cases it is often in the interest of both sides to make 
compromises. 29  Therefore, the EU’s normative requirements regarding 
these countries are not always met or they are fulfilled only after a 
bargaining process.  
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Given the above, this article sets four conditions that shape the interest 
calculations of the EU and the power hierarchy between the EU and third 
countries regarding the data exchange agreements. If one of these 
conditions is met, then EU relinquishes its imposing role and it is less 
persistent on the adoption of data protection rules. Otherwise, the EU 
adopts a stance based on hierarchical superiority and requires from the 
third country under question to adopt EU’s data protection norms.  
1. If the agreement with the third country enhances EU’s and 
Europol’s policies and institutional structures and benefits 
Europeans’ interests  
2. If there is a common terrorist threat between the EU and the 
third country, the EU is as much concerned with this threat as its 
counterpart and signing an agreement with this country is 
considered as a solution for eradicating the threat. 
3.  If signing an agreement with the third country enhances the 
good reputation of the EU institutions. 
4.  If the political environment within the EU is suitable for a 
compromise regarding the conclusion of an agreement with the 
third country. 
 
Transatlantic relations and the U.S.-Europol counterterrorism 
agreement  
The transatlantic security cooperation has a long history since during the 
Cold War the U.S. protected Western Europe in the face of Soviet 
aggression. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an increased emphasis 
was placed by both Americans and Europeans on the emerging threats of 
organised crime, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Regarding the 
threat of transnational terrorism in the pre-9/11 period, the absence of 
any spectacular terrorist attacks within the territory of the EU or the U.S. 
meant that this threat was not considered a top priority by either actor. 
This lack of political prioritisation was reflected in the fact that the EU-
U.S. counterterrorism cooperation did not expand significantly in the 
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period before the 9/11 attacks. 30  After the 9/11 attacks countering 
transnational terrorism moved at the top of the political and security 
agenda of both the U.S. and the EU.  
 
When the Bush administration declared a global war on terror in 2001,  it 
also asked  from its allies to choose their side and to either  support the 
U.S. or stand by with terrorists.31 As a key partner of the U.S., the EU 
was  asked to support the US-led global war on terror. The 9/11 attacks 
gave the opportunity to the U.S. authorities to  pressure both  the EU 
member states and the EU institutions.32 One of the US requirements was 
allowing the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to access the data 
bases of Europol.    
 
In response to the U.S. calls, the EU  was very keen to show its solidarity 
with the U.S. 33  In the extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting of September 20, 2001 the Director of Europol was invited to 
“take all the measures necessary (…) [in order] to establish informal  
cooperation with the United States, pending the conclusion of a formal 
agreement”. 34  Additionally, the Council called for Europol’s Director to 
finalise the strategic agreement with the U.S. by November and to open 
negotiations for a formal personal data agreement.   
 
In this respect, the first agreement  regarding  the posting of liaison 
officers and the exchange of strategic and technical data (excluding the 
sharing of personal data)  was signed in 6 December 2001.  It was 
followed by a supplemental agreement in 20 December 2002, which 
encompasses the exchange of personal data;35  Europol was authorised to 
share personal data with its US counterparts  including the names, 
addresses, and criminal records  of terrorist suspects.36 
 
The main point of friction in the Europol-U.S. negotiations for a personal 
data exchange agreement was the issue of data protection.37 The way 
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personal data was protected among European countries was different 
from the system that was in place in the U.S. The protection of personal 
data had a central place in Europol’s mode of operation as reflected in the 
organisation’s convention.38 In this respect, the EU had a detailed data 
protection regime (the comprehensive legislative framework model) based 
on a number of international agreements, rules and regulations, and on 
data protection supervisory authorities. Furthermore, the Europeans were 
sceptical about giving  much flexibility to  law enforcement agencies  
regarding the  storage and process of personal records  concerned about 
the risk of potential abuse.39  
 
The U.S. system, on the other hand, was based on sector-specific laws, 
the self-regulation of private sector and technologies that enhanced 
personal privacy.40 Contrary to the Europeans, the U.S. authorities see 
the law enforcement agencies as a strong partner of the U.S. justice 
system and in case of data protection abuses  from the law enforcement 
institutions the U.S. system relies on the judiciary for the correction of 
misconducts .41   
 
Despite these major differences between the two parties, in the 
negotiations that ensued, Europeans made a number of concessions to 
the Americans on the data protection issues of data retention, purpose 
limitation, data accuracy, and data protection adequacy. According to 
Europol’s rules, before the start of negotiations, the data protection 
system of the U.S. should have been assessed according to European 
standards.42 In practice, this never happened.43 Regarding the purpose 
limitation principle, the data that was requested and subsequently 
transferred should only be used for the purpose for which the request was 
submitted. In the Europol-U.S. agreement however the allowed use of the 
shared data was broadened. 44  Concerning data retention, Europol 
Convention stated that the organisation could not store data for more 
than three years and Europol’s Supervisory Body highlighted that this 
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time limit should be applicable to the data transferred to the U.S. too. The 
final text of the Europol-U.S. agreement did not include however any 
time-limitation to the storage of data, in accordance with the U.S. 
preferences on this topic. 45  Finally, there was no mentioning in the 
agreement about the deletion of incorrect data and about the number and 
status of the U.S. law enforcement agencies that would have access to 
the Europol information.46  
 
The above concessions of the EU and Europol mean that the EU was not 
in a position of hierarchical superiority which could allow Europeans to 
impose their data protection rules. In this sense, there was a situation of 
asymmetrical interdependence against the EU which led Europeans to 
compromise.  
 
The first reason for this compromise was that in the wake  of the 9/11 
attacks  where the U.S. had a superior and global role in  the fight against 
terrorism  Europe was left with no other choice than to cooperate with the 
U.S.47 In the context of the post-9/11  U.S. superiority, the EU authorities 
found a window of opportunity which allowed them to institutionalise their 
counterterrorism policies and Europol was central in this effort. 48  The 
security officials of the EU used the U.S. demands for enhanced 
transatlantic cooperation as an excuse for increasing the role and status 
of the Europol within the EU’s security machinery.49 This agreement was 
an opportunity for Europol to improve its intelligence network both 
internally and externally, given that many member states were reluctant 
to share critical information with Europol due to mistrust;50 the Europol-
U.S. agreement, however, paved the way for Europol to become a central 
body in EU’s intelligence, counterterrorism and law enforcement 
apparatus.  
 
A second reason for Europol’s flexible stance was the fact that Europol 
saw an opportunity for benefiting from U.S. intelligence which could 
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prevent future attacks at European soil.51 When the Al Qaeda declared its 
intention to target Western countries, along with the U.S. the EU 
countries were also included in the terrorist organisation’s list.52 In this 
sense, there was a common threat, that of Al Qaeda, that united the U.S. 
and the EU, and Europeans were as concerned about this threat as the 
Americans.  
 
The third reason behind Europol’s stance was that Europol officials wanted 
to enhance the status and the prestige of the European organisation 
through an agreement with the U.S. which emerged after the 9/11 
attacks as a dominant counterterrorism actor. 53   Such an agreement 
would confirm globally the status of Europol as an important pan-
European law enforcement institution. This was even more important if 
the frequent criticisms about the progress of Europol and EU’s third pillar 
are taken into account. In this sense, the dependency of Europol on the 
recognition by the U.S. led the EU to be less persistent on data protection 
issues in the negotiations with the Americans. 
 
The fourth factor that played a role in Europol’s stance was the fact that 
when the Europol-U.S. agreement was concluded Europol was not 
accountable to the European Parliament 54  and the European Court of 
Justice had a limited role on reviewing the actions of Europol.55 In other 
words, there was a suitable political environment for Europol to sign a 
data exchange agreement with the U.S. without consulting the European 
Parliament which has been critical of the EU-U.S. counterterrorism 
cooperation and without the risk of ECJ’s judicial review. 
 
In view of the four factors mentioned above, Europol faced a situation of 
interdependence with the U.S. in the field of counterterrorism and 
therefore the EU made a number of compromises on the issue of data 
protection for its own interest. This retrenchment from EU’s normative 
values could create a negative precedent on the effort of the EU and 
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Europol to export their norms to third countries which could accuse 
Europeans of double standards. In other words, when Europol insists on a 
third country adopting EU’s data protection rules this country could invoke 
the example of the Europol-U.S. agreement in order to undermine EU’s 
arguments on data protection. This could affect, for instance, the relations 
between Europol and Turkey which are analysed in the next section. 
 
The membership conditionality and the Turkey-Europol agreement  
Since the EU-Turkey relations were enhanced in 1987, when Turkey 
applied for a full membership, the fight against terrorism has always been 
a tense topic between the two parties due to Turkey’s hard-line 
counterterrorism policies towards domestic terrorist organisations such as 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The EU institutions, such as the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Commission, have 
frequently urged Turkey to transfer into the country’s counter-terrorism 
policies and implement in practice EU’s human rights-related norms and 
legislation.56 
 
In 1999, the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured and the PKK 
declared a ceasefire and withdrew its militants to Northern Iraq and this 
development brought also a change in the EU-Turkey relations on 
counterterrorism matters. In the same year the EU also provided a strong 
membership prospect to Turkey, which triggered a number of human 
rights-related and EU-originating reforms in Turkey. In particular, during 
these years, Turkey adopted nine harmonisation packages that 
encompassed a number of reforms related to improving the human rights 
conditions in Turkey’s counter-terrorism policy. 57 
 
Regarding the relations of Europol with Turkey, in 2000 the Council of the 
EU authorised Europol to sign an agreement with Turkey and a strategic 
agreement was signed between the Turkish National Police and Europol in 
2004.58 In these four years Turkey has investigated the pros and cons of 
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an agreement with Europol.59 The scope of this agreement was limited 
and it included the exchange of technical expertise and strategic 
information, training and internship programmes, the sharing of best 
practices, and mutual consultation of the two parties. The sharing of 
personal data was excluded from this agreement.  
 
The negotiation and conclusion of an operational agreement that would 
allow the exchange of personal data would depend on whether Turkey 
would adopt EU’s data protection rules.60 Indeed, the EU authorities such 
as EU’s counterterrorism coordinator have emphasized that the 
incorporation of EU’s data protection rules into the domestic level of 
Turkey is a central condition for the exchange of personal data between 
Europol and Turkey. 61  In particular, an important hurdle for Turkey’s 
cooperation with Europol is that Turkey has not yet ratified the Council of 
Europe’s “Convention of the for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data” which was signed by Turkey in 
1981. In order to enhance its counterterrorism cooperation with the 
Europol, Turkey has amended its constitution in a way that the protection 
of personal data is explicitly postulated. Furthermore, following this 
amendment, in June 2012, a draft law on the protection of personal data 
was also submitted to the parliament for consideration. Despite the above 
developments, there was no great progress in the adoption of the EU data 
protection norms by Turkey. According to senior officials from Turkish 
national police, the adoption of rules for the protection of personal data 
limits the capacity of the law enforcement agencies in Turkey to access 
personal data while conducting counterterrorism investigations and this is 
the main reason why the adoption process is slow.62  
 
In the face of Turkey’s reluctant stance regarding data protection, the EU 
and Europol have shown that they are not willing to compromise on data 
protection issues. This stance is in contrast with the stance that EU and 
Europol had towards the US demands and approach as seen previously. 
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The explanation of this inconsistency lay in the level of interdependence 
between Turkey and the EU and the fact that the EU is less dependent on 
Turkey than the vice versa. This creates a power asymmetry between 
Turkey and the EU and therefore the latter is less flexible and can more 
easily impose its data protection rules to the former. 
 
In particular, the first factor that has shaped the power asymmetry 
between Turkey and the EU is Turkey’s candidate status; as mentioned 
previously, the EU membership has been a strategic goal for Turkey in 
terms of both the economic and the political benefits that the membership 
entails. The “gatekeeper” role of the EU has increased Europeans’ power 
and the EU can as a result set the adoption of data protection rules by 
Turkey as a prerequisite for concluding a Europol-Turkey agreement. In 
this sense, Turkey’s longstanding counterterrorism experience and its 
enthusiasm for cooperating with the EU countries is not perceived as an 
opportunity by the EU and the member states to improve their own 
counterterrorism capacity. Turkey’s candidate status gives a negative 
impression that the EU does not have much to learn from Turkey and 
Turkey’s demands for closer cooperation were not enough to stimulate 
and bring together EU’s political actors for a common compromise. 
Therefore the EU does not take any initiative to mobilise member states 
and EU institutions to take action in line with Turkey’s demands. 
 
A second factor that has increased the power asymmetry between the EU 
and Turkey is that the PKK has not been a major threat to EU countries, if 
compared with to Al Qaeda network which was involved in the London and 
Madrid bombings of 2004 and 2005 respectively. On the contrary, there is 
even the risk for Europol and the EU that enhanced cooperation with 
Turkey can mobilise the PKK networks against EU states; for example 
when the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured in 1999 there were 
several violent protests in European countries.63 Additionally, the strong 
links of the PKK networks and the Kurdish diaspora with members of the 
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European Parliament meant that if a Turkey-Europol agreement was 
signed these networks would try to bring the issue of human rights and 
data protection in Turkey into the agenda of the Parliament and the ECJ.64 
In order to avoid negative ECJ rulings, the EU authorities were reluctant 
to sign a data exchange agreement with Turkey.  
 
As a caveat to the above argument, in recent years, the recruitment of 
European foreign fighters to the Islamic State (IS) through the Turkish-
Syrian borders and the possibility of these fighters to return to their home 
countries and to be involved in terrorist attacks in the EU is expected to 
change the existing asymmetrical situation in favour of Turkey; the EU 
may, as a result, compromise on some data protection issues. According 
to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence (ISCR), by 2015 the estimated number of foreign fighters joining 
the IS from EU countries has reached to almost 4000.65 The IS atrocities 
towards EU citizens, including several beheadings and the terrorist attack 
against the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists in France, necessitates the 
cooperation of Europeans with Turkey in order to stop radicalised 
European citizens from traveling to Iraq and Syria. The Europol Chief Rob 
Wainwright has also highlighted the need for the EU and Europol to 
cooperate with third countries establishing, for example, a database of 
foreign fighters.66 In order to facilitate the exchange of personal data with 
Turkey through the conclusion of an operational agreement and prevent 
the increasing IS threat for the EU both the EU institutions and member 
states may therefore ease their data protection requirements. But this 
may affect future negotiations only in the medium to long term. 
 
A third factor is that, if compared to the U.S. case, cooperation with 
Turkey does not add much in terms of the international status and 
prestige for Europol. While cooperation with the U.S. enhanced the 
international recognition and actorness of Europol, cooperation with 
Turkey, which has not been a trendsetter country in global 
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counterterrorism, cannot bring similar benefits. For this reason Europol 
has been less flexible with Turkey and less willing to accept concessions 
on data protection issues. 
 
Finally, since 2009 and the coming into force of the Lisbon treaty, Europol 
has become an EU agency, which implies that the European Court of 
Justice has acquired jurisdiction over the whole area of justice and home 
Affairs, including Europol; Europol’s agreements with third countries are 
therefore under the legal scrutiny of the ECJ 67  and Europol has less 
autonomy compared to the pre-Lisbon treaty period when the agreements 
with the U.S. were signed.68 In other words, the political environment is 
not favourable for Europol and this factor reduces the ability of Europol to 
be more flexible and make compromises on the issue of data protection in 
its negotiations with Turkey. 
 
To sum up, in view of the above four conditions, the EU is less dependent 
on Turkey than vice versa and it insists on a hierarchical superiority mode 
of relations for now. The EU has not made any compromises with Turkey 
on data protection as it has done in the U.S. case. While this strict 
approach enhances the normative aspects of the EU, it also reveals an 
inconsistent stance on the part of the EU and Europol regarding the 
degree to which they insist on the adoption of European norms and rules 
by third countries. A comparison of the cases of Turkey and the U.S. 
shows that the EU acts in a pragmatic manner on the issue of data 
protection. The EU has been dependent on the U.S. and therefore it has 
accepted the American demands. It has not, however, made any 
concessions towards its EU candidate partners, such as Turkey, due to the 
fact that it is less dependent on them. A similar pattern of relationship is 
evident in the Morocco-EU/Europol relations which are analysed in the 
next section. 
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Political conditionality and the Morocco-Europol agreement  
The relations between the EU and the European Neighbourhood countries 
of the Mediterranean started in 1995 with the Barcelona Process which 
aimed towards the promotion and adoption of liberal democratic norms in 
the Mediterranean region.69 When it was launched, this initiative aimed to 
ensure stability and security in the Mediterranean area through a Political 
and Security Dialogue, an Economic and Financial Partnership and a 
Social, Cultural and Human partnership. Regarding security issues, at that 
time more emphasis was placed on the issues of organised crime and 
illegal immigration rather than on the issue of terrorism.70 In 2004 the 
broader European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched which 
included the countries of the Barcelona Process. The ENP was modified by 
the EU’s enlargement policy instruments.71  
 
After the 9/11 attacks and especially after the attacks in Madrid and 
London the EU perceptions towards the ENP countries changed. Regarding 
Morocco, the involvement of Moroccan citizens to the Madrid Bombings 
necessitated a closer cooperation of the EU with this country on 
counterterrorism issues, including the conclusion of an agreement with 
Europol on the sharing of personal data.72 At that time, however, the ENP 
reports mentioned that there were significant shortcomings in the 
capacity of Morocco to fight terrorism within the limits set by democratic 
and human rights norms and within the rule of law. 73  Therefore, an 
important condition that Europeans set for the conclusion of an 
operational agreement with Morocco was the improvement of human 
rights and the strengthening of the rule of law in the area of 
counterterrorism. 
 
In 2005 the ENP plan for Morocco was adopted which prioritised the 
enhancement of judicial and police cooperation on counterterrorism 
matters between Morocco and member states and the negotiation of a 
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Morocco-Europol Agreement. Such an agreement has not yet been 
concluded despite the efforts towards this direction that date back to 
2000’s.74 In general, in the context of the fight against terrorism, the EU 
and Europol depend to a great extent on the ENP countries for terrorism-
related intelligence. This dependency can potentially increase these 
countries’ leverage in their interactions with the EU. 75 In practice, in the 
case of Morocco the need of Europol for potentially useful Moroccan 
intelligence did not lead the European organisation in a more 
compromising stance on data protection issues and Morocco has not 
taken advantage of this European dependency. The uncompromising 
stance of the EU, despite European dependency on Moroccan intelligence, 
was based on several reasons.  
 
Firstly, the EU’s is perceived as superior in the context of the ENP 
framework and there is a perceived asymmetry of interests and power 
between the two sides. This superiority and power asymmetry is related 
to the economic and normative advantages of EU member states in 
comparison with the ENP countries. In order for the EU to provide 
financial and technical rewards to Morocco it sets a number of pre-
conditions, including rules and norms on the protection of personal data. 
If Morocco does not comply with these preconditions then the EU holds 
back the financial and technical benefits. At the same time, the EU does 
not see any reason for compromising with Morocco on data protection 
issues given that cooperation with Morocco is not perceived as enhancing 
EU’s and member states’ counterterrorism capacity.   
 
A second factor is that there is no common terrorism threat between the 
EU and Morocco. While the EU has seen the Al Qaeda as a major threat to 
its own security, Morocco’s threat perceptions regarding Al Qaeda has not 
been as high as the EU’s. Therefore, if the EU is more flexible with 
Morocco on data protection, this is not likely to reduce the Al Qaeda 
threat to Europe. Additionally, such a compromise will mostly benefit 
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Morocco rather than the EU; Europol can obtain personal data from 
Morocco even without an agreement in place. Morocco, however, cannot 
have access to Europol intelligence without firstly abiding to data 
protection rules and concluding a data exchange agreement. As a result 
of the above, the lack of a common threat among the two actors means 
that the EU-Morocco interaction is not a symmetrical relationship in terms 
of power and interests. 
 
However, the recent expansion of the IS in Syria, Iraq and the unstable 
countries of the Maghreb has created risks for Morocco. According to ISCR 
figures, Morocco has a very high number of citizens (1500 individuals) 
fighting for the IS, coming third after Tunisia (1500-3000) and Saudi 
Arabia (1500-2500).76 The return of these fighters to Morocco and the EU 
is a security risk for both sides of the Mediterranean. The main concern of 
the EU is the prevention of radicalised individuals who may plan terrorist 
attacks from entering EU countries.77 The above may create the impetus 
for the urgent negotiation of a Morocco-Europol data exchange 
agreement.    
 
Regarding the actorness dimension, a relationship with Morocco has little 
value in terms of enhancing the global image of Europol as a dominant 
counterterrorism actor. Morocco has not been either as strong a 
counterterrorism player at the global level as the US78 or at the regional 
level as Turkey. Therefore, the EU is not dependent on Morocco’s 
recognition of Europol as a counterterrorism partner, which means that it 
is less likely that Europol and the EU will be flexible with Morocco on data 
protection. 
 
Finally, the political environment in Europe has changed after the entering 
into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, making it more difficult for Europol 
to have a flexible approach towards Morocco on data protection issues. 
Though after the shock of the 9/11 attacks the political environment was 
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more favourable for the conclusion of an agreement between Morocco and 
Europol, no progress has been achieved so far. In the post-Lisbon treaty 
period the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement with Morocco has 
been more risky for Europeans. If Europol concludes an agreement with 
Morocco before the latter has adopted EU’s data protection regulations, 
the actions of Europol will come under scrutiny from the European 
Parliament and the ECJ. Therefore, the lack of a suitable political 
environment which would allow Europol to be more flexible means that 
Europeans insisted on their data protection demands. 
 
In line with the four conditions explained above, EU and Europol have 
been less dependent on Morocco than vice versa and this has created a 
situation of asymmetrical interdependence and power asymmetry in 
favour of Europeans. Similarly to its stance towards Turkey, the EU 
follows an uncompromising stance towards Morocco. Ultimately, the 
European approach towards Morocco reflects the diverse and pragmatic 
nature of EU’s external relations which are ultimately based on 
calculations of interests rather than on normative concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has shown that the interdependence between two 
international actors can potentially create a situation of power asymmetry 
where the stronger side influences the weaker sides’ interest calculations. 
If the weaker actor is dependent on the benefits provided by the stronger 
actor then it compromises and adapts its priorities in order to sustain 
cooperation with the stronger party. The powerful actor may, however, 
also compromise if it sees any opportunities for enhancing its own 
interests and the power asymmetry between the two sides is, as a result, 
diminished.  
 
The above can be seen in Europol’s relations with third countries and in 
Europol’s data protection requirements when considering the conclusion of 
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data sharing agreements. On the one hand, if the EU is dependent on a 
third country for operational cooperation then the power asymmetry 
between the EU and the third country diminishes and the EU adopts a 
more flexible approach regarding the adoption of data protection norms. 
On the other hand, if the EU is less dependent on a third country for 
operational cooperation then it is reluctant to make any compromises and 
it adopts a stance of hierarchical superiority over the third country. The 
EU’s  ambivalent approach on data protection rules which is shaped  
mostly by the power dynamics between the EU and third countries 
undermines, as a result, both its   normative reputation and its reliability 
in its relations with third countries.  
 
 
 
 
This ambivalence is expected to continue in the future.  As noted in the 
Turkey and Morocco cases, the recent threat posed by the IS means that  
the EU political actors may be more flexible in the future  in order to 
facilitate the exchange of data and intelligence with third countries which 
do not have, however, as high democratic standards and credentials as 
the EU. In other words, according to the model developed in the article, it 
is expected that the increased terrorist threat posed by the IS and the 
situation in Syria will change EU’s interest calculations and therefore the 
power asymmetry between the EU and the countries which can play a role 
against these threats will be reduced. 
 
In this respect, one path that the EU political actors are expected to follow 
in the future is to  continue prioritizing the counter-terrorism cooperation 
with third countries and being more flexible regarding the EU’s data 
protection regime. In other words, EU’s stance of normative superiority, 
according to which third countries should always adopt EU’s data 
protection norms and standards en bloc when cooperating with the EU, 
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will continue being replaced by a more pragmatic EU behaviour. This 
pragmatism is derived from the EU realization that closer counter-
terrorism cooperation with third countries (especially with those in its 
close vicinity) is essential for EU’s security and safety. Such a conviction 
makes the EU actors more flexible when negotiating data protection 
standards.   
 
This article supports the general argument that in its external relations 
the EU could be described more as a pragmatic and realist actor rather 
than as a normative actor and, in particular, that security concerns 
regarding terrorism have taken priority over the broader and normative 
goals of human rights promotion and data protection.79 In other words, 
this article complements previous research concerning whether the EU 
has upheld to its values and normative commitments in its internal 
security relations with third countries by looking at Europol’s relations 
with three countries and by examining the reasons behind the European 
inconsistency and ambivalence on data protection norms.  
 
Moving beyond Europol’s relations with third countries, the conceptual 
model presented by this article can be applied to additional cases 
examining the EU inconsistency and behaviour in other fields. Further 
research could be done, for instance, on comparing how the EU 
negotıated its Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreements with the U.S., 
Canada, and Australia and on looking whether the EU was consistent in its 
data protection requirements during these negotiations.  
  
In order to do that, the EU authorities should not only prioritize their own 
policies, institutions and reputation whilst signing an agreement with third 
countries. Furthermore, waiting until the formation of a common terrorist 
threat between the EU and third country should not be a precondition of 
signing a data exchange agreement. Finally, the EU policy makers should 
find ways to ease legal and political conditions to facilitate conclusion of 
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data exchange agreements with third countries for the sake of EU 
security.  
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